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Abstract
This paper adopts the Impulse-Response methodology to under-
stand ination persistence. It has often been argued that existing
models of pricing fail to explain the persistence that we observe. We
adopt a common general framework which allows for an explicit mod-
elling of the distribution of contract lengths and for di¤erent types of
price setting. We also evaluate how far the theories are consistent
with recent evidence on price and wage rigidity. We nd that allow-
ing for a distribution of durations can take us a long way to solving
the puzzle of ination persistence, but not all the way yet.
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1 Introduction.
In this paper we explore how far existing theories of wage and price setting are
consistent with two empirical features: rst the macroeconomic persistence
we observe in ination, second the microeconomic data on nominal rigidity of
wages and prices. There has been a considerable focus on the macroeconomic
aspects of modelling ination persistence1. However, more recently there is
now a considerable amount of microdata available on the behaviour of prices
in the Eurozone and the U.S., which allows us to evaluate existing theories
of pricing2. Very broadly, we can divide the wage and price setting models
into four categories, which di¤er in how they model wage-price behaviour3:
1. The wage-price is set in nominal terms for a xed and known period
(e.g. Taylor (1980), Fuhrer and Moore (1995))
2. The wage-price is set in nominal terms for a random duration (e.g.
Calvo (1983))
3. There is a xed or uncertain contract length, and the rm/union sets
the wage-price for each period at the beginning of the contract (e.g.
Fischer (1977), Mankiw and Reis (2002)).
4. The initial wage-price is set, but throughout the contract length the
nominal wage-price is updated according to recent ination (Index-
ation): (e.g. Woodford(2003, p. 213-218), Christiano et al. (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003)):
The theories in category 3 and 4 were developed in a large part to model
ination dynamics better and put right the shortcomings in the simple forms
1Examples include Nelson (1998), Mankiw and Reis (2002), Smets and Wouters (2003),
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2004), Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Dotsey and King (2006), Coenen, Christo¤el and
Levin (2007), Ireland (2007).
2Dhyne, Alvarez, Bihan, Veronese, Dias, Ho¤mann, Jonker, Lunnemann, Rumler and
Vilmunen (2005) provide a summary of European Central Bank-Ination Persistence Net-
works (IPN) ndings on consumer prices. Bils and Klenow (2004) present evidence on
the proportion of prices that change in a month for consumer prices across categories of
the U.S. economy.
3This list includes all of the main models that have unchanging distributions of du-
rations; it excludes state-dependent pricing models, such as Dotsey, King and Wolman
(1999), which do not.
2
of theories 1 and 2 (Taylor and Calvo) which have for some time been known
to be inadequate in this respect (e.g. Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Christiano
et al. (2005)). There is a crucial di¤erence between the rst two categories
and the second two: in 1 and 2 the nominal wage-price set will last more
than one period (usually a period corresponds to a quarter); in 3 and 4, the
wage-price will in general be di¤erent in every period. Whilst the sticky
information (Mankiw and Reis (2002)) and Calvo-with-indexing (Christiano
et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003)) are able to model ination per-
sistence well, it is at the cost of having prices and/or wages changing every
quarter, which contradicts the empirical micro evidence. If we explicitly
allow for sectoral heterogeneity with the ranges of contract lengths suggested
by the data, we move a long way towards explaining ination persistence
whilst being consistent with the micro evidence on nominal rigidity. We
consider two distributions of contract lengths: the Calvo distribution and
one derived from US data (Bils and Klenow (2004)).
In section 2 we present the empirical evidence on ination and nominal
rigidity. In section 3 we outline a generic macroeconomic framework which
allows us to explore the di¤erent models and generate impulse-response func-
tions (IRFs) for ination for di¤erent models within a common environment.
We also discuss the calibration of the common framework. In section 4
we evaluate the IRFs of the di¤erent wage-price models and in section 5 we
discuss how these respond to a key parameter. In section 6 we conclude.
2 The Evidence on Ination Persistence and
Nominal Rigidity.
Empirical studies show that monetary policy shocks have persistent e¤ects
on ination. A common way to illustrate this fact is to regress ination on
its own lags and then sum the coe¢ cients on lagged ination. If the sum of
the coe¢ cients is high, then a shock will lead to a changed level of ination
for an extended period. For the U.S., Clark (2006) nds that the sum of
the autoregression (AR) coe¢ cients for the aggregate ination series is about
0.9. Batini (2002) nds that for the Euro zone 1970-2002 the coe¢ cients sum
to around 0.7, varying across countries. Whilst some studies (e.g. Cogley
and Sargent (2001), Levin and Piger (2004), Taylor (2000)) show that the
coe¢ cient is reduced if you allow for structural breaks and regime switches,
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few would argue for coe¢ cients near to zero4.
Second, there is the evidence of vector autoregressions (VARs) which in-
troduce another dimension: the shape and timing of the response of ination
to monetary policy. It is widely agreed that ination exhibits a delayed
response to monetary policy. That is, the maximum e¤ect of a policy occurs
sometime after the policy: there is a hump-shaped response. Views about the
timing of the peak di¤er. The traditional view was put forward by Fried-
man: monetary policy has "long and variable lags"; the impact on ination
could peak as long as eight quarters or even more. Certainly, this is the view
taken by the Bank of England: when setting monetary policy, the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) looks eight quarters ahead5. The European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) takes the view that the maximum impact is six quarters.
Di¤erent researchers have estimated the response to be anywhere from four
quarters (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003)) to twelve quarters (e.g. Nelson
(1998), Batini and Nelson (2001), Batini (2002)).
We can summarize these observations by three stylized facts or features:
Feature 1 The biggest e¤ect is not on impact (hump shape)
Feature 2: The biggest e¤ect is (a) after 4Q, (b) after 8Q, or (c) after 12Q
(timing of hump)
Feature 3: After 20 Q, the e¤ect on ination is (a) 1%, or (b) 5% of the
maximum (persistence).
In the case of Feature 2, we take three di¤erent values for the timing,
corresponding to the moderate view (8Q), the preemptive view (12Q) and
the rapid view (4Q). Likewise, for Feature 3, we have two thresholds.
Turning to the microdata on nominal rigidity, there has recently been a
huge increase in what we know about pricing as a result of economists gaining
access to the data collected by national statistical o¢ ces for the purpose of
constructing price indices. Most signicant here are the Ination Persistence
Network (IPN) in the Eurozone which covers all of the major Euro economies
and the work of Bils and Klenow (2004) in the U.S.
4 In fact, Pivetta and Reis (2007) show that the evidence for a reduced coe¢ cient in
cases of structural breaks and regime switches is not statistically signicant.
5Oddly enough, though, the Bank of Englands own model (BEQM) has the peak
impact at six quarters.
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The BK data set give us the proportion of prices that change (on average)
per month in each of the goods and services covering 70% of the U.S. CPI
for the period 1995-7. We can interpret this as a sector-specic Calvo reset
probability and then generate the corresponding distribution of durations (by
duration we mean a "price spell", period in which the nominal price remains
unchanged). To do this we use Dixon and Kara (2006a) which generates the
distribution of durations across rms6. Having the distribution across each
type of good or service, we can then aggregate across sectors using the CPI
weights to give us the corresponding aggregate distribution of durations in
the U.S. Figure 1 plots this distribution in terms of quarters:
Fig1 : BK  Distribution of durations across rms.
The mean contract length is 4.4 quarters. Perhaps the most striking aspect
of this distribution is its skewness: there is a very high share of short-term
durations, the share of 1 and 2 quarters is about 50%, but also a tail of very
long durations. The European data is similar in broad outline.
PMD1: Nominal prices and wages remain unchanged for about 4Q on av-
erage.
PMD2: There is a highly skewed distribution of durations, with a high
proportion of exible prices but a tail of long durations.
Having reviewed the stylised facts we can ask a fundamental question.
Is there a model which is generated from a theory consistent Dynamic Sto-
chastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework with reasonable calibrations
which is consistent both with the stylised facts about ination persistence,
and also consistent with the micro data? One key feature to note is the
combination of Feature 2 and PMD1: if we take the consensus view of an 8Q
hump, then we need a theory that can yield a hump despite having a mean
contract length of around 4Q.
3 The Model.
We present a framework which is able to encompass all four wage-price setting
frameworks based on the idea of an economy consisting of many sectors
6The distribution across rms is equivalent to the cross section across prices set.
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di¤erentiated by how long a contract (whether of Type 1-4) lasts. Following
Dixon and Kara (2007), we present the log-linearized equilibrium conditions
of a DSGE model in which there can be potentially many sectors, each with
a di¤erent contract length7. When each sector has a Taylor-style (Type
1) contract we have a Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE). When each
sector has a Fischer-style (Type 3) contract we have a Generalized Fischer
economy (GFE). We will also want to allow for indexation (Type-4). The
exposition here aims to outline the basic building blocks of the model. We
rst describe the structure of the contracts in the economy, the wage-setting
process under di¤erent models and monetary policy. We then describe the
behavior of wages and prices in a log-linear model which encompasses most
approaches. For convenience, we present the model in terms of wage-setting,
but the framework is also consistent with price-setting (as we discuss below).
3.1 The Structure of Contracts.
In this section we outline an economy in which there are potentially many
sectors di¤erentiated by the duration of contracts. There are N sectors8,
i = 1:::N , with sector shares i summing to unity
PN
i=1 i = 1

: Contracts
in sector i last for i periods. There is a unit interval of rms f 2 [0; 1] and a
matched unit interval of rm-specic household-unions (one per rm). The
sector share i is the measure of rms in sector i: Within each sector i there
are i equally sized cohorts of unions and rms: each period one cohort comes
to the end of its contract and starts a new one. A standard Taylor model
is represented by an economy in which one sector (usually i = 2 or 4) has a
share of unity, the rest zero. In the GTE, in each sector i there is a Taylor
contract; in the GFE, a Fischer-style contract.
The simple Calvo model is di¤erent from the GTE because the wage
setters do not know how long the contract will last: each period a fraction
! of rms/households chosen randomly start a new contract. However, the
Calvo process can be described in deterministic terms at the aggregate level
because the rm-level randomness washes out. As shown in Dixon and
Kara (2006a), the distribution of contract lengths across rms is given by
i = !
2i(1 !)i 1 : i = 1:::1, with mean contract length T = 2! 1 1 The
7The detailed derivations can be found in the appendix of an earlier draft of this paper,
ECB working paper 672, Understanding Ination Persistence.
8N can be innite.
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Calvo model with indexation has the same structure of contract lengths, but
there is indexation throughout the contract life in response to past ination.
The Mankiw-Reis sticky-information (SI)model is a special case of the GFE
with the Calvo distribution of contract lengths.
3.2 The Macroeconomy.
Here we present a common framework in the form of a log-linearized macro-
economic model which reects the generic form that is derived from DSGE
models with nominal rigidities in prices and/or wages. It is assumed that
there is a nal aggregate output produced from intermediate goods under
constant returns which is available for consumption. The sectoral output
level yit can be expressed as a function of the sectoral price pit relative to
the aggregate price level pt and aggregate output yt where the coe¢ cient 
is the elasticity of demand (this is the log-linearization of a CES production
function relating intermediate outputs to aggregate output):
yit = (pt   pit) + yt (1)
In the intermediate good sector, labour is the only input and returns are con-
stant, so that prices are a markup over wages, the markup being determined
by the elasticity of demand . In log deviation form, sectoral price levels are
given by the average wage set in the sector, and the wage is averaged over
the i cohorts in sector i:
pit = wit =
1
i
iX
j=1
wijt (2)
The log-linearized aggregate price index in the economy is the average of all
sectoral prices:
pt =
NX
i=1
ipit (3)
The ination rate is given by t = pt   pt 1.
We close the model with the demand side, which is given by a simple
quantity theory relation:
yt = mt   pt (4)
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The money supply follows the following process;
mt = mt 1 + ln (t) ; ln (t) = v ln
 
t 1

+ t (5)
where 0 < v < 1 and t is a white noise process with zero mean and a nite
variance.
3.3 Wage-Setting Rules.
Before dening the optimal wage setting rules under di¤erent models, let us
dene the optimal wage that would occur if wages were perfectly exible (we
call this "the optimal ex wage"). The log-linearized version of the optimal
ex wage in each sector9 is given by
wt = pt + yt (6)
with the coe¢ cient on output  being:
 =

LL
+ cc
1 + 
LL
(7)
Where cc =
 UccC
Uc
is the parameter governing risk aversion, 
LL
=  VLLH
VL
is
the inverse of the labor elasticity,  is the sectoral elasticity (1)
We can represent the alternative wage-setting behaviour in terms of a two
general equations: one for the reset wage in sector i (xit), one for the average
wage in sector i (wit): For the GTE, these are10:
xit =
iX
j=1
ijEtw

t+j 1   a
iX
j=1
iX
k=j
ij+kt+j 1 (8)
wit =
iX
j=1
ij
 
xit j 1 + a
j 2X
k=0
t+k 1
!
(9)
where ij = 1i and 0 < a  1 measures the degree of indexation to the past
ination rate. Without indexation (a = 0), the reset wage (8) in sector i
9Note that the optimal ex wage in each sector is the same. This is because it is based
on the demand relation (1) which has the same two aggrgegate variables fpt; ytg for each
sector. Also, we make the common approximation for quarterly data that  = 1.
10The detailed derivations of the equations are presented in a technical appendix, which
is available in the working paper version.
8
is simply the average (expected) optimal wage over the contract length (the
nominal wage is constant over the contract length). Note that the reset
wages will, in general, di¤er across sectors, since they take the average over
a di¤erent time horizon. With indexation, the initial wage at the start of
the contract is adjusted to take into account of future indexation over the
lifetime of the contract. The average wage in sector i (9) is related to the
past reset wages and how far they have been indexed.
The two equations (8 and 9) can also represent the simple Calvo economy.
To obtain the simple Calvo economy from (8), all reset wages at time t are the
same (xit = xt), the summation is made with i =1 and ij = !(1  !)j 1 :
j = 1:::1: and there is no indexation a = 0: Assuming 0 < a  1 extends
these model to the case in which the wages are indexed to past ination.
The standard equation for the average wage is obtained by setting wit = wt,
and setting the summation as i =1 in (9).
In a GFE, the trajectory of wages is set at the outset of the contract.
Suppose an i  period contract starts at time t; then the sequence of wages
chosen from t to t + i   1 is Etwt+s	s=i 1s=0 . Hence, the average wage in
sector i at time t is
wit =
iX
j=1
ijEt j+1wt (10)
which is the average of the best guesses of each cohort for the optimal ex
wage to be holding at t and embodies "sticky information" idea in Fischer
contracts: part of current wages are based on old information. In the GFE,
since cohorts are of equal size within sector i, ij = 1i . The Mankiw-Reis
sticky-information (SI) model has ij = ! (1  !)j 1 : j = 1::1:
3.4 The Choice of Parameters.
Following the literature, we set 
CC
= 1 and 
LL
= 4:5. The parameter
 determines the steady state markup
 

 1

: Studies by Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2004) and Kimball (1995) suggest a value of  = 11: Chari, Kehoe
and McGrattan (2000) use a value of  = 10: Coenen et al. (2007) consider
a range of values, from 5 to 20. In light of these studies, we set  = 12:
Given the calibrated values of 
CC
; 
LL
and ; we get a value of  = 0:1,
which is the value adopted by Mankiw and Reis (2002) and which we take
as our initial reference value. With price setting, Chari et al. (2000) argue
that the correct calibrated level of  is much larger, being 1:2. However,
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Edge (2002) argues that these authorsnding can be misleading, as their
conclusion relies heavily on the assumption that all rms use identical inputs:
she demonstrates that if CKM were to assume a rm specic labour market,
then they would have obtained a similar value of  whether price or wage
setting is assumed11. One further rationale for lower values of  is given by
Kimball (1995), who assumes that rms are reluctant to increase their price
above the average if demand for their own good decreases sharply. Several
studies appeared recently in which the Kimball (1995) aggregator is assumed
(e.g. Altig et al. (2004), Coenen et al. (2007), Smets, Wouters and de Walque
(2006)). Coenen et al. (2007) argue that there is a reasonable calibration of
 based on rm-specic input that is consistent with a value of  = 0:027.
Non-microfounded econometric estimates of  tend to be smaller: Taylor
(1980) estimates ^ = 0:05, Coenen et al. (2007) estimate ^ = 0:003   0:027
and Fuhrer and Moore (1995) estimate ^ = 0:00512. Our reference set for  is
thus f0:1; 0:05, 0:027; 0:01; 0:005g : When it comes to the serial correlation
of money growth , we follow Christiano et al. (2005) and set  = 0:513.
4 The Impulse Response Functions for Ina-
tion.
We rst look at the Calvo simple Taylor (ST ) models. As is well known,
neither of these fare well in modeling the stylised features. The policy we are
simulating is a one o¤ 1% shock in  at t = 0. In this section, all reported
simulations adopt benchmark values  = 0:1 and  = 0:5: the latter implies
a long-run cumulative e¤ect of 2% on ination from the AR(1) process (5).
4.1 The Problem : Standard Taylor and Calvo Models.
The Calvo (1983) pricing model has a single parameter: the reset probability
or hazard rate, !, which gives the non-duration-dependent probability that
a rm/union will have the option to reset its wage in any period. Figure
11See also Ascari (2003) and Woodford (2003).
12See Roberts (2005) for a survey and an attempt to reconcile the di¤erences in published
estimates.
13Note that some other studies suggest even higher values. Chari et al. (2000) estimate
a value of  = 0:57 and Huang, Liu and Phaneuf (2004) use a value of  = 0:68.
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2a illustrates the IRF of ination to a one percent innovation in the money
supply.
Figure 2 Calvo & Simple Taylor
As the gure shows, the Calvo model cannot deliver a hump shaped ina-
tion response; the maximum is always in the rst period (unless one imposes
ex-ante pricing). As is well known (e.g., Woodford (2003), chapter 3), the
purely forward-looking nature of the Calvo model is the main reason for
this result. On the other hand, Feature 3(b) is satised for both values of
!. The failure of the Calvo model to generate the observed responses of
ination suggests that there might be a backward-looking element missing.
The intertemporal backward-looking and forward-looking e¤ects in the Tay-
lor model are emphasized by Taylor (1980). Figure 2b displays the impulse
response function of ination in Taylors staggered contract model for con-
tract lengths T = 2; 4; 6 and 8. The maximum ination response in Taylors
model is indeed delayed for a few quarters and it reaches its peak T   1
quarters after the rst period in which the shock occurs14. There is a hump
shape of sorts, but a rather jagged one. Hence Features 1 and 2 can be met.
However, the simple Taylor contract will only generate a hump at around
two-years if the contract lasts for that length of time (T = 8) which is in di-
rect conict with the microdata PMD1. Furthermore, if we turn to Feature
3, ination dies away rapidly T periods after the shock. In particular, for
T = 4, the e¤ects of the shock are almost gone after 15 periods; this certainly
fails to meet even the weak criterion.
To summarise: Calvo can give us persistence (Feature 3) but no hump;
Taylor gives us a hump at the length of the Taylor Contract, but fails Feature
3. The precise value of  does not alter these conclusions much: Calvo always
peaks on impact, Taylor T   1 periods after the shock whatever the value
of , which inuences persistence Feature 3. Taylor is inconsistent with the
micro-data: even a simple Taylor with a mean of 4Q or 5Q will not display
the distribution of lengths suggested by empirical studies. Calvo can be
more consistent with PMD2, although the mean contract length requires a
reset probability of ! = 0:4.
14Every cohort setting their wage from the period of the shock sets the wage knowing the
innovation in the money supply. The last cohort to set its wage without this information
is the one that set its wage the period before the innovation. Its contract ends T   1
periods after the shock; ination peaks when this cohort resets its wage.
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4.2 Solution 1: Indexation in the Calvo Model.
There has been much empirical work done on the New Keynesian Phillips
curve. As is well known, it does not do well in explaining the data (see
for example Gali and Gertler (1999)). One model that does much better
empirically is the hybrid Phillips curve, which takes the form
t = (1  )Ett+1 + t 1 + byt (11)
where  2 [0; 1] and  = 0 gives the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This has
given rise to attempts to construct a theoretical model that can yield (11).
The currently popular theoretical justication is to add indexation to the
Calvo model (see for example Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters
(2003), Woodford (2003))15: at the beginning of the contract the nominal
wage is set, and for the contract duration this is updated by the previous
periods ination (Christiano et al. (2005) call this "lagged ination index-
ation"). This hardwires lagged ination into current ination. Woodford
(2003) shows how this gives rise to a HPC with  = 0:5.
In Figure 3, we display the response of ination to a monetary shock for
! = 0:25 and ! = 0:4 (average contract lengths of 7Q and 4Q respectively).
As the gure illustrates, introducing backward-looking indexation can a¤ect
the impact of the shock on ination and leads to a hump shaped response.
The model can satisfy Feature 1 and provide a hump peaking at 5   6Q.
However, even when ! = 0:25, the model fails to generate enough persistence
to satisfy Feature 3. Clearly, if we are thinking of prices, the notion of full
indexation is inconsistent with the micro-data PMD2 and PMD1: a model
with full or even partial indexation implies that every rm adjusts its price
every period.
Recent work by Ireland (2007) (see also Cogley and Sbordone (2005)) ar-
gues that large and persistent movements in ination could not happen unless
consistent with monetary policy and reecting implicit shifts in the ination
target. Ireland (2007) considers this possibility by using a Calvo model that
allows for continual movements in the central banks ination target. The
di¤erence between the Ireland model and the indexed-Calvo model is that
the nominal wage-price is updated according to the central banks ination
target, rather than the pervious periods ination rate. Ireland compares
15Another justication is the older Fuhrer and Moore model, which we do not include
here, but is covered in an older version of the paper ( ECB working paper 672).
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the empirical performance of his model with that of the Calvo model with
full indexation. He nds that the new model performs better empirically
than the indexed-Calvo model and, therefore, concludes that shifts in the
central banks ination target can substitute for backward-looking term in
the Phillips curve in explaining ination. However, updating prices with the
implicit ination target still falls foul of the microdata16.
4.3 Solution 2: Distributions of Fischer Contract Lengths.
In this section we consider a Generalized Fischer Economy (GFE): an econ-
omy with many sectors, each with a Fischer contract where the wage-setter
chooses a trajectory of wages, one for each period for the whole length of the
contract Fischer (1977). The wages are thus conditional on the information
the agent has when it sets the wages, so that as the contract gets older the
information will be increasingly out of date17.
There are two general points that need to be understood when interpret-
ing the Fischer contracts. First, the IR functions are generated by a single
innovation in the initial period. The initial shock is perpetuated because we
assume that money follows an AR(1) process. However, any new contract
that starts after the initial shock will be fully informed. Once all contracts
have been renewed after the shock, the economy will behave as if there is full
information and exible wages/prices. The second point is that the length
of the contract has no inuence on the wages chosen for any specic period
covered by the contract. This is because a separate wage can be chosen for
each period within the contract. Therefore, it makes no di¤erence to the
wage chosen for period 2 of the contract whether the contract will last for 2
16Kiley (2005) adopts a slightly di¤erent approach to indexation. Kiley (2005) follows
Gali and Gertler(1999) to assume a model with two di¤erent types of wage-setters: a
proportion, (1  a) ; are Calvo wage-setters of the orthodox kind and the rest are "rule of
thumb" agents who update using lagged ination; however, lagged ination is a moving
average over the last b periods. Woodford (2003) is a special case when b = 1 and a = 0:5.
Our adaptation of Kileys approach has 4 parameters: fa; b; ; !g We take the value of
 = 0:1 and consider the two cases considered by Kiley for fa; bg = f0:24; 1g and f0:17; 4g
with two values of (! = 0:25 and ! = 0:4). We nd that the models performance is not
signicantly di¤erent from that of Woodfords model. More specically, in this model
there is a hump, but it peaks well before 8Q: In fact, it does not even reach 4Q even when
! = 0:25 with an average contract length of 7Q.
17An alternative interpretation is that the rm sets its wage or price optimally each
period, but that it only updates its information infrequently.
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periods or 10 periods: the period 2 wage will be its best guess at what the
optimal wage is going to be in that period.
Mankiw and Reiss Sticky Information model (SI) is a GFE where the
distribution of contract lengths is Calvo with their choice of ! = 0:25, re-
sulting in an average length of 7 quarters. The parameter ! is presented
as a "re-plan" probability18: just as in the Calvo model, when the trajectory
of wages is chosen at the outset of the contract, the wage-setter does not
know how long it will last but has a subjective distribution over the lifetime.
However, as we have noted, the length of the contract has no inuence on
the wage-setting behavior. Hence the SI model as presented by Mankiw
and Reis is exactly the same as a Calvo-GFE: an economy where there is a
Calvo distribution of contract lengths but in which each wage setter knows
exactly how long the contract will run for. With Fischer contracts, the
Calvo reset probability is only important in generating the distribution of
durations: nothing else.
In Figure 4 we depict the IR functions for the SI model with ! = 0:25.
The SI model has a smooth hump, peaking at the 8th quarter, and ination
dies away slowly so that Feature 3(b) is satised. The reason for this shape
is the distribution of contract lengths and in particular the longer contracts
that let ination persist. Hence, introducing heterogeneity into the Fischer
model moves the model in the direction of explaining all three facts. With a
Fischer contract, the price or wage setter tries to predict the optimal ex price
or wage. Since this depends on the general price level, the trajectory of prices
builds in anticipated ination. The monetary policy IR has a hump shape
because most rms have to wait to replan their price-plans once the new
policy is in e¤ect. Thus, for those yet to revise their plans, the pre-shock
inationary expectations are driving their prices. The Calvo distribution
ensures that the hump is smooth and peaks at the required time.
As in the case of Calvo with indexation, ination is "built in" in a way
that is not consistent with the micro data: prices change every period and
the calibrated value of ! = 0:25 implies a mean contract length across rms
much longer than 4 quarters. However, since the "contract" here refers
to a planning horizon, there is no clear-cut microeconomic evidence for its
appropriate calibration. However long or short the "contract", prices change
every period which violates both PMD1 and PMD2.
18The reset probability can also be interpreted as arising due to "optimal inattention",
as in Reis (2006).
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4.4 Solution 3: Distributions of Taylor Contract Lengths.
In this section, we now return to simple Taylor contracts, but with a distri-
bution of contract lengths, considering two special GTEs. These di¤er in
the share of weights across di¤erent durations, i: The Calvo-GTE, in which
the share of each duration across rms is the same as generated by the Calvo
model19: for ! = 0:25; which has a mean contract length of 7Q and a modal
lengths of 3 and 4Q. Second we use the distribution of duration data using
the Bils and Klenow (2004) as shown in Figure 1.
The ination impulse-responses for these two distributions of contract
lengths are depicted Figure 5.
Figure 5:IRFs for B-K and Calvo GTE.
We can see immediately that adding a distribution of contract lengths has
greatly improved the t of the IRFs compared to the simple Taylor contract.
They now have a hump, with the Calvo-GTE peaking at 4Q, although the
peak is too soon for B   K (2Q). Furthermore, they both have enough of
persistence to satisfy Feature 3. The distributions are quite di¤erent: the
B  K has fatter tails: the modal frequency is quarterly and the mean is a
less than the Calvo with ! = 0:25.
The comparison between the simple Calvo and the Calvo-GTE deserves
some thought. They di¤er in the wage-setting decisions: in the Calvo model
the wage-setters do not know the length of their contract, but have a prob-
ability distribution over contract lengths and hence all wage-setters set the
same price. In the Calvo-GTE; each wage-setter knows its contract length
when it sets the wage. As we can see, in terms of Feature 1, the Calvo-GTE
does have a hump shape. Hence moving from the Calvo economy to the
GTE with the same distribution of contract lengths lets us satisfy Feature
1 in addition to Feature 3. The intuition for this is that when rms set the
wage or price in period t in the Calvo-GTE, they know the length of their
contract, and for the purpose of setting their wage or price need not think
further ahead. This makes price and wage setters more myopic: whereas in
the simple Calvo rms must look ahead into the distant future when setting
their price, in the corresponding GTE they need only look forward as far
as their next contract. This makes the Calvo resetter react more initially,
because it is looking ahead to future ination.
19For computational purposes, we truncate the distribution at i = 20 and put all of the
mass of the contracts i  20 onto i = 20.
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If we use exactly the same distribution of contract lengths as in the SI
and Calvo with indexation, the Calvo-GTE with ! = 0:25, we can see that
we can have a model that is more consistent with the microdata PMD2 and
which gives a hump at 4Q and so is consistent with the rapid view Feature
3(a). However, it has the drawback of a mean contract length that is almost
twice as long as PMD1.
5 Role of the Key Parameter :
We have thus far considered the ability of the di¤erent models with cali-
brated parameters values to match the key features. We now examine how
the changes in the key parameters inuence the models with respect to macro-
economic Features 1-320. The parameter  is important as it determines the
inationary pressure on wages and prices that results from an increase in out-
put. A low value of  means that this inationary pressure works through
more slowly so that the reaction of ination to output growth becomes slower.
Table 1 shows how Features 1-3 fare for each of the models at the di¤erent
reference levels of  discussed in section 3.4: 0:1; 0:05; 0:027; 0:01; and 0:005.
Where there are weak and strong criteria (Features 2 and 3), the more ticks
indicate that the stronger criterion being met. Table 2 gives the exact timing
of peak ination.
Table 1 Features 1-3 as  varies.
Table 2: The peak response.
.
Let us rst take the case of the models with the Calvo distribution of
contract lengths in which prices change every quarter: SI; IC. With the
standard Calibration of ! = 0:25; both models satisfy F1 and strong F3 for
all values of . The key issue is the timing of peak ination (F2), given in
Table 2, which gets more delayed as  falls. Sticky information meets the
moderate view at  = 0:1, and gets longer as  gets smaller. Indexed-Calvo
meets the moderate view somewhere between  = 0:1 and  = 0:027. These
models both perform well at the macro-level, but at the cost of violating the
microdata. If we impose the Calibration ! = 0:4, then we see that matters
are di¤erent. For the IC and SI, F3 is not satised in even its weak form
when   0:027: The moderate view of the peak is attained only when
 < 0:027.
20Clearly,  has no e¤ect on or relevance for microeconomic features PMD1 and PMD2.
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Turning to the Calvo GTE, we see that with ! = 0:25, F1 and F3 are
satised for all . The peak response meets the rapid criterion for  = 0:1
and the moderate when  = 0:027. This model has a distribution of contract
durations, but the mean is too long. If we impose PMD1 and set ! = 0:4,
then the resulting Calvo distribution is much closer to the microdata on both
counts. For   0:027; the rapid peak and also the strong view of F3 are
both satised. Thus, the Calvo   GTE is the only model with the Calvo
distribution that is consistent with the microdata and also can satisfy the
macro features F1-3. However, the peak response will be too rapid for many
macroeconomists.
Lastly, we can look at the BK   GTE, which has the actual empirical
distribution of contract lengths which by construction satises PMD1 and
PMD2. For all values of , F1 and F3 are satised. What of the peak
ination? Well, for "calibrated"  = 0:027; the peak is at 3Q. This
"almost" satises the rapid view (recall that we can follow Woodford (2003,
p. 207-213) and introduce pre-set pricing to add an extra quarter lag into
the pricing decision, taking the peak response form 3 to 4Q). What is more
interesting is what happens when  = 0:01: Even though the BK GTE has
an average contract length of 4:4Q, it peaks at 7Q. This would both satisfy
the moderate view of peak ination and be consistent with the microdata.
However, as yet this can only be attained at a value of  below the lowest
"calibrated" value currently proposed.
When there is a distribution of contract lengths, a decrease in  will
tend to delay the maximum impact if there is already a hump shape and will
move the models with a distribution signicantly towards explaining all three
features. In fact, this nding, to a large extent, explains the result obtained
by Coenen et al. (2007). There, it is argued that a model with Taylor style
contracts that allows for a distribution of contract lengths and assumes a
Kimball(1995) aggregator along with the assumption of rm-specic input,
which helps to lower  (  = 0:027); ts the German data and the US data
very well without needing the assumption of backward-looking indexation.
6 Conclusions.
It has been long known that the new Keynesian dynamic wage and price set-
ting models have problems in generating the sort of impulse-response func-
tions generated by empirical VARS, and that they do not capture what policy
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makers feel are the features of the response of ination to monetary policy
reected in our stylized "features". This problem has lead to two main re-
sponses in the literature: the introduction of indexation into the Calvo model,
and the adoption of Fischer contracts and a Calvo distribution of Contract
lengths (Sticky Information). Both of these theories are inconsistent with
the micro data on prices: not only do all prices change each period, but also
with standard calibrations the average duration of contracts across rms is
nearly twice as long as the Bils-Klenow data set suggests, and is almost as
long as the "moderate" view of the hump at 8Q.
We have explored an alternative approach which is to keep to simple con-
tracts which specify a given nominal wage or price for a specic length of
time, but explicitly model the distribution o¤ contract lengths. We do this
for two types of distribution: the Bils-Klenow distribution and the Calvo dis-
tribution. We nd that we can obtain a hump-shaped response with plenty
of persistence. With the calibration suggested by Coenen et al. (2007) the
Calvo GTE is the only model that can satisfy all three ination-persistence
features, with the hump occurring at 4Q (the rapid view) and is consistent
with the microdata PMD1-2. However, we have found the interesting phe-
nomenon that for lower values of the  parameter the hump in ination can
peak at 7Q or more with the empirical Bils-Klenow distribution, which is
much longer than the mean contract length. We nd that this is the only
theory that is consistent with the micro-data on prices and can potentially
explain ination persistence.
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 0:1 0:05 0:027 0:01 0:005
Calvo-GTE; !=0.40 3 4 4 5 6
Calvo-GTE; !=0.25 4 5 7 9 11
BK-GTE 2 2 3 7 10
SI; ! = 0:40 5 6 7 9 11
SI; ! = 0:25 8 11 13 16 19
IC; ! = 0:40 5 6 7 9 11
IC; ! = 0:25 6 8 10 13 16
Table 2: The peak response of ination (in quarters)
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Figure 1: BK Distribution
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Figure 2: (a) Ination response in the Calvo economy. (b) Ination response
in the simple Taylor economy.
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Figure 3: Ination response in the indexed-Calvo.
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Figure 4: Ination response in the SI.
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Figure 5: (a) Ination response in the Calvo-GTE and the Calvo economy.
(b) Ination response in the BK-GTE.
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